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Abstract
The Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System
(AFHSC-GEIS) has the mission of performing surveillance for emerging infectious diseases that could affect the
United States (U.S.) military. This mission is accomplished by orchestrating a global portfolio of surveillance
projects, capacity-building efforts, outbreak investigations and training exercises. In 2009, this portfolio involved
39 funded partners, impacting 92 countries. This article discusses the current biosurveillance landscape,
programmatic details of organization and implementation, and key contributions to force health protection and
global public health in 2009.
Introduction and background
Despite optimism in the 1960s that mankind had con-
quered infectious diseases, the world has repeatedly con-
fronted the reality of its continued vulnerability. Two
landmark Institute of Medicine (IOM) reports outlined
these vulnerabilities [1,2]. Recent events emphasize the
wisdom of these documents, and the fact that the global
community must unite to address emerging infectious
diseases.
The first of two IOM reports, released in 1992, high-
lighted the potential role of Department of Defense
(DoD) overseas laboratories in addressing the vulnerabil-
ities of emerging infections. DoD has a long history of
medical research and development, much of which has
been performed through a network of overseas labora-
tories. Although their geographic locations have changed
through time, five laboratories were in operation in
2 0 0 9 :C a i r o ,E g y p t ;N a i r o b i ,K e n y a ;B a n g k o k ,T h a i l a n d ;
Lima, Peru; and Jakarta, Indonesia in 2009 (Figure 1)
[3]. Historically, the role of these laboratories was lim-
ited almost exclusively to the research and development
of products, such as vaccines, antimicrobials or
diagnostics, that would benefit the health of DoD forces
throughout the world. Surveillance for infectious dis-
eases, however, was minimal. Between 1992 and 1996,
numerous documents and communications within DoD
recognized the need for global emerging infection sur-
veillance initiatives leveraging these overseas labora-
tories, and emphasized the commitment of DoD to
these endeavors.
In 1996, the Executive Office of the President of the
United States issued a Presidential Decision Directive
(NSTC-7) stating that current capabilities were inade-
quate to protect the U.S. or global public health com-
munities from emerging infectious disease (EID) threats
[4]. DoD was again specifically noted among various
federal agencies as having global presence and expertise
that could be leveraged to help improve worldwide EID
surveillance and preparedness. With these events, the
DoD Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and
Response System (DoD-GEIS) was established, thereby
expanding the mission of DoD to address threats posed
to the U.S. and other nations by newly emerging and re-
emerging infectious diseases. This was a timely develop-
ment: The next decade brought SARS, West Nile virus
and avian influenza, to name a few, and more recently,
the H1N1 influenza virus emerged in 2009 as a pan-
demic threat.
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Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC) by direction
of the deputy secretary of defense [5]. This move centra-
lized DoD-wide healthcare surveillance initiatives with
domestic and overseas laboratory surveillance efforts. In
2009, AFHSC-GEIS provided direction, funding and over-
sight to a network of 39 partners (Table 1) at approxi-
mately 500 sites. Ninety-two countries were impacted with
either active surveillance, capacity-building initiatives or
participation in training exercises (Figure 1). This paper
will summarize implementation of this global DoD labora-
tory surveillance network and its contributions in 2009,
and discuss potential for the future as the U.S. government
becomes increasingly proactive in global biosurveillance.
The current global biosurveillance landscape
In addition to AFHSC-GEIS, many other DoD, U.S. gov-
ernment and U.S. nongovernmental organizations
engage in surveillance or capacity-building activities
throughout the world [6,7]. In 2009, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) spent more than
$1.7 billion on health and over $1.4 billion on humani-
tarian assistance [8]. Fiscal year 2009 appropriations by
the U.S. Congress totaled $33.7 million for the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Global Dis-
ease Detection Program, the principal and most visible
CDC program for developing and strengthening global
public health capacity to rapidly identify and contain
disease threats from around the world. The total budget
for CDC’s global health programs in fiscal year 2009—
including the Global AIDS Program, Global Immuniza-
tion Program, Global Malaria Program and others—was
$308.8 million [9]. The U.S. Department of State’s Biolo-
gical Engagement Program (BEP) received congressional
appropriations of $27 million in fiscal year 2009 to
engage scientists internationally on issues related to
disease surveillance and detection, biosafety and biose-
curity. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
addresses animal health surveillance in the U.S., but is
also engaged internationally in capacity building,
research and biological control, and outbreak response,
with a focus on identifying and evaluating biological
agents that could impact global commerce of agricul-
tural products [10]. USDA is also the official U.S.
representative to the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE).
Through Defense Health Program funding, the assistant
secretary of defense for health affairs provides $52 million
annually to AFHSC-GEIS. The assistant to the secretary of
defense for nuclear and chemical and biological defense
programs recently embraced emerging infections as a
threat to national security, placing global surveillance also
within the scope of that organization [11]. Implemented
largely through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, his-
torically that organization’s focus has been threat-agent
reduction and containment in the former Soviet Union.
Authorization to extend globally and beyond threat agents
is in process and will be conducted in part through the
agency’s Cooperative Biological Engagement Program.
This is likely to result in an additional infusion of
Figure 1 Global reach of AFHSC-GEIS partnership through surveillance, capacity building or training initiatives.
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Page 2 of 10Table 1 Global partners 2009 and region of engagement
FY09 Funded Partners Primary Countries Engaged
1 65
th Medical Brigade – Korea Republic of South Korea
2 Armed Forces Institute of Pathology – Washington, DC Global U.S. DoD visibility
3 Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences –
Bangkok, Thailand
Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Philippines, Nepal & Bhutan and US Embassies and
Consulate offices throughout Southeast Asia
4 Australian Army Malaria Institute – Enoggera, Australia Australia, Vanuatu & Solomon Islands
5 Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance
Medicine – Bethesda, MD
Numerous with global distribution
6 DoD Veterinary Food Analysis & Diagnostic Laboratory
– Fort Sam Houston, TX
Overseas food & water production facilities with DoD procurement contracts and
US military installations supporting Military Working Dogs and food facilities
7 University of Iowa – Iowa City, IA Thailand, Cambodia, Mongolia, Nigeria & Romania
8 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory –
Laurel, MD
US military installations; Philippines, Peru & Cambodia
9 Landstuhl Regional Medical Center – Germany US military treatment facilities in Southwest Asia, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain,
United Kingdom, Turkey, Poland & Ukraine
10 National Aeronautics and Space Administration –
Greenbelt, MD
Numerous with distribution primarily in Africa, Southeastern Europe and Central
Asia
11 Naval Health Research Center – San Diego, CA US military training facilities; 2
nd,3
rd and 7
th US Naval Fleets and deployed US
Naval & Marine Corps personnel in Western Pacific region; US/Mexico border clinics
with US CDC
12 Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center –
Portsmouth, VA
US military treatment facilities within the military health system (MHS)
13 Navy Environmental Preventive Medicine Unit – 2 –
Norfolk, VA
US military treatment facilities in Djibouti, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq &
Afghanistan; deployed US Naval & Marine Corps personnel in Southwest Asia &
shipboard activities in the Atlantic
14 Navy Medical Research Center – Silver Spring, MD Numerous with global distribution
15 Navy Medical Research Center Detachment – Lima,
Peru
Eleven countries in Central & South America
16 Navy Medical Research Unit – 3 – Cairo, Egypt Thirty-four countries in West/North Africa, the Middle East & Central Asia and
deployed US Forces throughout Southwest Asia and Eastern Europe
17 Navy Medical Research Unit-2 – Jakarta, Indonesia Cambodia, Lao PDR, Indonesia & Singapore
18 Pacific Air Force – Hickman AFB, HI Lao PDR & Vietnam
19 Public Health Command Region - Europe (formerly
CHPPM-Eur) – Landstuhl, Germany
US military treatment facilities in Southwest Asia, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain,
United Kingdom, Turkey, Poland & Ukraine
20 Public Health Command Region - Pacific (formerly
CHPPM-Pac) – Camp Zama, Japan
US military treatment facilities & deployed US Forces in Japan & South Korea
21 Public Health Command Region - South (formerly
CHPPM-South) – Fort Sam Houston, TX
US military treatment facilities; civilian MoH laboratory centers in Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua & Panama
22 San Antonio Military Medical Center (formerly BAMC) –
San Antonio, TX
US military treatment facilities in Southwestern US
23 U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Disease – Fort Detrick, MD
US military treatment facilities & overseas VHF laboratory in Sierra Leone
24 U.S. Army Medical Research Unit – Kenya – Nairobi,
Kenya
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Cameroon & Nigeria
25 U.S. Northern Command – Colorado Springs, CO US military installations & coordination with Mexico and Canadian counterparts
26 U.S. Southern Command – Miami, FL Deployed US Forces throughout Latin America
27 UCLA/Global Viral Forecasting Initiative – San
Francisco, CA
Cameroon
28 Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences –
Bethesda, MD
US military treatment facilities & overseas military research laboratories in Peru,
Egypt, Kenya, Thailand, Indonesia & Korea
29 United States Africa Command – Stuttgart, Germany Deployed US Forces throughout Africa
30 United States Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine
– Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio
US Military MTF sentinel sites around the world
31 United States Central Command – MacDill AFB, FL Deployed US Forces throughout Southwest and Central Asia
32 United States European Command –Stuttgart,
Germany
Deployed US Forces throughout Europe & Central Asia
33 United States Pacific Command – Camp H.M. Smith, HI Deployed US Forces throughout Far East, Southeast Asia & the Pacific
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not directly involved in surveillance efforts, the Military
Infectious Disease Research Program (MIDRP) has a mis-
sion of protecting the U.S. military against infectious dis-
eases through research and development projects designed
to develop products for mitigation, such as vaccines, medi-
cations or vector-control systems. Excluding pediatric vac-
cines, DoD had a major role in developing and licensing
40 percent of currently available vaccines for adults in the
U.S. [12]. Most drugs licensed for the treatment of malaria
were also products of DoD research and development
[13,14]. AFHSC-GEIS surveillance provides baseline infec-
tious disease risk data that directly influences priorities
and viable geographic locations for the conduct of various
projects within the MIDRP.
Much of the justification for engagement by the U.S.
government in this work falls under the category of
“health diplomacy.” The meaning of “global health diplo-
macy” can be controversial, but a commonly accepted
definition by the University of California at San Francisco
is “political change activity that meets the dual goals of
improving global health and maintaining and improving
international relations abroad, particularly in conflict
areas and resource-poor environments.”
The involvement of DoD partners throughout the
world in implementing this program can clearly be seen
as serving a global health diplomacy role. By conducting
surveillance and capacity building and assisting with
training and outbreak investigations, all integrated into
the functions and capabilities of host-country agencies,
relationships are forged and trust is developed. Interna-
tional relations abroad are improved. Other DoD organi-
zations work in this broad field of health diplomacy, but
less directly in active biosurveillance.
Funding avenues and oversight for these different U.S.
government health and surveillance initiatives are inde-
pendent of each other, and coordination is complex.
In a recent publication, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies commented that with expanding
efforts, agencies should leverage the existing successful
programs, and seek a “unity of effort.” [15]. The release
in November 2009 of the National Strategy for Counter-
ing Biological Threats (Presidential Policy Directive-2)
also emphasizes the need for coordination: “No single
stakeholder can fully address the challenge of biological
threats on its own” [16]. This document uses similar ter-
minology as many of the mid-1990s documents that
resulted in the development of DoD-GEIS.
Why the Department of Defense?
The global laboratory assets of DoD have long been
recognized as valuable platforms from which to conduct
biosurveillance. Each laboratory is “sponsored” in-coun-
t r yb ye i t h e rt h eM i n i s t r yo fD e f e n s eo rM i n i s t r yo f
Health. In addition, close working relationships exist
with other components of the host and neighboring
countries’ governments and academic institutions. Lever-
aging and empowering these relationships is a formula
for success with expanded activities. Maintaining person-
nel at these military laboratories has also proven sustain-
able over time, when other U.S. government programs
found this to be difficult. DoD’s unique ability to provide
valuable logistical support is a factor, as is its global inte-
grated health care system meeting the health needs of
uniformed families throughout the world that can help
determine exposures and risk. The synergy between this
system and the DoD laboratory system is becoming clear
now that both organizations exist at AFHSC.
Another reason for DoD engagement in these endea-
vors lies in DoD’s mission to “deter war and protect the
security of our country” [17]. Combat aggressors are but
one threat to our security. In the words of James Baldwin,
novelist and civil rights activist, “The most dangerous
creation of any society is the man who has nothing to
lose.” Endemic diseases in many resource-poor settings
are a cause of instability. Each year, more than 1.6 million
people die from diarrheal disease, 800,000 from malaria
and 20,000 from dengue fever [18-20]. This burden of
known endemic diseases imposes an economic toll and
resulting instability. In contrast, emerging infections,
whether naturally occurring or the result of human intro-
ductions, can result in social unrest and instability on a
Table 1 Global partners 2009 and region of engagement (Continued)
34 Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Division of
Bacterial Diseases – Silver Spring, MD
US military treatment facilities & overseas military research laboratories in Peru,
Egypt, Kenya, Thailand & Indonesia
35 Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Division of
Clinical Trials – Silver Spring, MD
Support to global system
36 Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Division of
Entomology – Silver Spring, MD
Numerous with global distribution
37 Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Division of
Experimental Therapeutics – Silver Spring, MD
Support to global system
38 Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Division of
Virus Diseases – Silver Spring, MD
Over 35 US embassies & deployed military personnel worldwide; overseas military
research laboratories in Peru & Thailand
39 Walter Reed Army Medical Center - Washington, DC Support to military personnel deployed to Iraq & Afghanistan
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introduce [21]. Though new agents have the potential for
high morbidity and mortality, fear can have an even
greater impact.
One example is the severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) that rapidly spread around the world in
2003. By midyear, 8,098 individuals were known to
have been infected with SARS, resulting in 774 deaths.
In the scope of international infectious diseases, this
toll on human life was minor. However, the economic
impact is estimated at between $40 billion and $52 bil-
lion [22]. Likewise, 17 infections and five deaths were
attributed to the intentional anthrax attacks in 2001.
These small numbers do not adequately speak to the
crippling disruption of services or huge economic
losses incurred. According to a recent IOM report,
“Global health and national security are inexorably
intertwined” [23].
Considering these facts, the enormous importance of
early identification and mitigation of infectious disease
threats is a critical component of a national defense
strategy to “deter war and protect the security of our
country.”
Implementation of the AFHSC/GEIS program:
methods
The GEIS system functions on a model of “priority
pillars” and “strategic steps” ( F i g u r e2 ) .T h ep r i o r i t y
infectious disease pillars include respiratory, gastroin-
testinal, febrile and vector-borne, antimicrobial-resistant,
and sexually transmitted infections. The strategic steps
include surveillance and response; training and capacity
building; research, innovation and capacity building; and
communication of value added. Through integrated
implementation of the strategic steps, a comprehensive
yet flexible program is created which recognizes the
needs of host and partner countries.
Funding for global surveillance initiatives in 2009
was approximately $52 million; $40 million of this was
for pandemic/avian influenza initiatives (respiratory
pillar), with the remainder available for surveillance in
the other EID pillars. In preparation for distribution of
these funds, a request for proposals was circulated
among partner laboratories in the third quarter of fis-
cal 2008. A total of 198 proposals were received and
evaluated by an internal review board of AFHSC staff.
Each proposal was evaluated based on a) potential to
fill a critical gap in public health programs, b) likeli-
hood of tri-service or DoD-wide benefits, c) facilitation
of timely public health actions, d) responsiveness to
critical operational theater or regional needs, e) quality
of epidemiology and science, f) leveraging of existing
strengths, and g) accessibility of nonfiscal resources
needed for execution. In addition, prior performance
of the requesting organization and principal investiga-
tor was taken into consideration. Proposals were
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Infection
Figure 2 Priority pillars and strategic goals of the AFHSC-GEIS program.
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Page 5 of 10ranked based on scores received, and a cutoff level for
funding was assigned based on score and available
funding. An external review board, not associated with
AFHSC-GEIS and representing all three major uni-
formed services, reviewed overall funding decisions
and provided recommendations. Finally, GEIS and
AFHSC directors were briefed and given the opportu-
nity for input. Of the 198 proposals received, full or
partial funding was available for the top-ranked 66 per-
cent (130 of 198 proposals), and 56 percent of
requested funding was allocated.
Communication of value added
Communication within and outside the network was
conducted in a variety of ways: required quarterly
reports, monthly conference calls with awarded partners,
consolidated DoD influenza reports (with variable fre-
quency from daily to weekly during the emerging 2009
H1N1 pandemic), site visits with program reviews, peer-
reviewed publications, and presentations at multiple
DoD and civilian international conferences. Results were
reported only with local-host or partner-country notifi-
cation and concurrence. In general, the information
requested and shared by the GEIS network was aggre-
gate in nature. GEIS does not archive extensive data sets
from partners or host countries. Analysis and interpreta-
tion is largely done by the partner conducting the work,
in collaboration with the host country, and with ulti-
mate consideration of national sovereignty and transpar-
ency in the process.
The central coordination of this global DoD surveil-
lance system afforded multiple opportunities for
enhanced utilization of partner capabilities, as well as
concise information sharing with other DoD organiza-
tions and external agencies (Table 2). The many exam-
ples share a central theme of leveraging global visibility
and connecting needs with capabilities.
Communication with the World Health Organization
(WHO) and CDC is a priority, with a DoD liaison posi-
tioned in both organizations to facilitate bilateral infor-
mation exchange. The value added to these two
organizations by the GEIS network is clear in the exam-
ples of the WHO reference laboratory status of Naval
Medical Research Unit Number 3 (NAMRU-3) in Cairo,
Egypt, and U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Kenya
(USAMRU-K). Both laboratories were highly leveraged
in training and laboratory capacity building during the
2009 H1N1 pandemic [24]. Numerous influenza contri-
butions to the WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance
Network through CDC is another example. These con-
tributions have resulted in numerous examples of
viruses isolated by DoD’s surveillance network being
used as reference strains and the virus seed strain for
seasonally available influenza vaccines [25,26].
This global DoD surveillance network should not and
does not operate in a vacuum. A review of the DoD-
GEIS influenza programs by IOM in 2007, conducted
after the first year that the network received avian influ-
enza/pandemic influenza (AI/PI) supplemental funds,
commented: “DoD-GEIS should further strengthen its
coordination and collaboration on pandemic influenza …
with all U.S. partners … These partners include
HHS [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services],
CDC,…” [27]. The rapid communication to CDC of the
novel H1N1 strains identified by two GEIS partner
laboratories before any other public health laboratory (see
Table 3) is evidence of the implementation of this recom-
mendation. Though funded partners clearly understand
the need for timely processing of samples and expeditious
communication, it must be continually reinforced
throughout the global surveillance network. Personnel
turnover is high, and communication of these ongoing
needs is a priority.
Accomplishments: fiscal year 2009
In its entirety, this special supplement of BioMed Central
outlines many of the extensive accomplishments of the
global GEIS partner network in 2009. Tables 3 and 4 out-
line the “Top 10 accomplishments of the global network,”
and the “Top 10 specific localized accomplishments.”
Publications and presentations
Another metric for success is the number of publica-
tions in peer-reviewed journals and presentations given
by network partners. An accurate count is difficult
Table 2 Specific examples of central coordination, fiscal
year 2009
1. Funding NMRC for development, production and sharing within
partner network of rickettsial diagnostic tests
2. Funding USAMRIID for development, production and sharing
within partner network of lassa fever and other select agent
diagnostic tests
3. Funding BAMC for development, production and sharing within
partner network of leptospiral diagnostic tests
4. Facilitation of sample sharing for advanced characterizations
a. Partner H1N1 samples to WRAIR for full-genome sequencing
b. Shipboard outbreak respiratory and serum samples to NHRC for
determination of etiology and immune status
5. Facilitation of ongoing discussions and updates on outbreaks
among host-country populations and U.S. military beneficiaries
in all regions under surveillance
6. Facilitation of brief summaries and updates of activity related
to the 2009 pandemic of A/H1N1
a. Provided a forum for case reporting and regional surveillance
findings among network labs and near partners within the
countries (InstitutPasteur, PAHO, academic partners)
NMRC: Naval Medical Research Center; USAMRIID: U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases; BAMC: Brooke Army Medical Center; WRAIR:
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research; PAHO: Pan American Health
Organization.
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Page 6 of 10because the independent network partners leverage
funding from various sources for their initiatives.
Nevertheless, 112 manuscripts associated with projects
partly or wholly supported by AFHSC-GEIS were pub-
lished in 2009; the number of poster sessions and pre-
sentations at various public and private conferences
was far higher.
Broadly speaking, 33 peer-reviewed publications
encompassed febrile and vector-borne infections and
other infectious diseases; 25 were in the realm of
respiratory infections, including influenza; 19 described
emerging infections; 18 were associated with malaria;
nine were about gastrointestinal infection; seven
described antimicrobial-resistant organisms; and one
was related to sexually transmitted infections. Though
populations under surveillance were often a mixture of
military and civilian, 28 of these publications were
directly related to U.S. or foreign military populations.
These numbers attest to the scientific rigor with which
partners conduct their work, their ability to leverage
funding to create a relatively balanced portfolio covering
all five pillars of infectious disease threats of military
importance, and their emphasis on military populations.
The way forward: tools for success
International Health Regulations (2005)
The WHO International Health Regulations, established in
1969, were originally intended to identify several specific
diseases of concern (plague, yellow fever, cholera and
smallpox) among travelers entering a given country. The
events of the past few decades have made it clear that a
new paradigm was needed to minimize the global impact
of an emerging pandemic and its toll on human life. To
this end, the International Health Regulations (2005), or
IHR (2005), were formally adopted by the WHO 58th
World Health Assembly on May 23, 2005, and took effect
on June 15, 2007 [28]. The focus of these new guidelines
changed from specific diseases of concern to any event
that could be considered a “public health emergency of
international concern.” Assessments of current capabilities
in countries throughout the world were completed in
2009, and compliance with minimum standards of detec-
tion and reporting is required by 2012. Building local cap-
ability and infrastructure for compliance is the clear goal
in IHR (2005), and the regulations acknowledge and
encourage countries and organizations that are able to
assist resource-poor countries in their compliance process.
Considerable coordination and communication with
in-country ministries, academic institutions and other
in-country government assets is done by AFSHC-GEIS
global partners. However, collaboration and capacity
building conducted by DoD partners is being re-
examined to comply with a broader U.S. government
response, the National Strategy for Countering Biologi-
cal Threats, and the IHR (2005) framework. The White
House National Security staff is playing an active role in
this U.S. government coordination. By conducting our
program in coordination with this whole of US Govern-
ment, then our capacity building, outbreak assistance
and facilitating in-country diagnostic capabilities with
host countries will meet the objectives of all by a) rein-
forcing amiable relationships between host-country
Table 3 Top 10 accomplishments of the global network, 2009
1. Conducted active infectious disease surveillance, capacity building, training or outbreak investigations in approximately 92 countries and 500
locations through a global network of partners.
2. Served as the primary source for global avian influenza detection. Of globally reported H5N1 infections, 71 percent (37 of 52) were identified or
confirmed at DoD partner laboratories funded by AFHSC-GEIS, with the vast majority being performed at the NAMRU-3 laboratory in Cairo, Egypt.
3. Detected the first four cases of novel A/H1N1 through two partner laboratories, the Naval Health Research Center and the U.S. Air Force School of
Aerospace Medicine. Communicated results to the CDC.
4. Supported the diagnostic confirmation of the first novel A/H1N1 cases in 14 countries (Bhutan, Cambodia, Colombia, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt,
Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Nepal, Peru, Republic of the Seychelles).
5. Centrally consolidated over eight laboratory- and region-specific partner reports into an extremely well-received and informative one-page
dynamic document of the “Department of Defense Global Surveillance Summary.”
6. Improved infrastructure at 52 laboratories in 46 countries, including eight military and 44 civilian laboratories, with emphasis on influenza, and
leveraged capability for other emerging infectious disease initiatives.
7. Sponsored and/or conducted 123 training exercises with more than 3,130 representatives from 40 countries.
8. Responded to more than 76 outbreaks in 53 countries; 24 outbreaks were at U.S. domestic and foreign installations, 36 were in partnership with
foreign civilian entities and 15 with foreign militaries.
9. More than 15 reports of first laboratory confirmation of etiologic disease causes in regions where the disease had not been previously reported,
including leptospirosis, yellow fever, Q fever, brucellosis, St. Louis encephalitis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, various rickettioses and other
pathogens.
10. Supported partners tested more than 72,000 respiratory samples, of which more than 17,000 (24 percent) were influenza-positive and more than
10,000 (15 percent) were novel A(H1N1).
AFHSC-GEIS: Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System; DoD: Department of Defense;
NAMRU-3: Naval Medical Research Unit Number 3; CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
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developing the capability to report “public health emer-
gencies of international concern,” whereby the entire
global community and DoD learns, and world prepara-
tions to minimize impact can proceed in a unified and
transparent manner; and c) improving DoD’ss i t u a t i o n a l
awareness through close, transparent, trusting relation-
ships with host countries, even if an actual public health
emergency of international concern does not occur.
Military-to-military cooperation and collaboration
As briefly discussed in the biosurveillance landscape sec-
tion of this paper, many U.S. government organizations
are becoming involved in global biosurveillance. The
mission of DoD’so v e r s e a sl a b o r a t o r i e sn e c e s s i t a t e sc o n -
tinued engagement with in-country public health autho-
rities. However, with rapidly increasing involvement of
other U.S. government agencies, a unique niche that U.
S. uniformed officers throughout the world can and
should expand engagement is with their global uni-
formed counterparts. In many cases, militaries are the
major providers of health care in their countries, with
abilities that far exceed their civilian programs. Despite
political agendas, remarkable progress in facilitating
open lines of communication can occur when two
researchers or public health professionals, regardless
of cultural or economic background, establish mutual
rapport for a mutual interest: optimal health of their
uniformed service members.
Although many military-to-military lines of communi-
cation and collaboration currently exist (Table 5),
another mechanism AFHSC used to facilitate increased
activities in 2009 began with an expanded relationship
with the International Committee of Military Medicine
(ICMM). ICMM was established in 1921 by Belgian and
U.S. medical officers (Commander Medical Officer Jules
Voncken and Captain William Bainbridge) after World
War I “revealed the importance of closer cooperation
between armed forces medical services worldwide” [29].
With 104 member countries, ICMM is an unbiased,
transparent organization with the goals of maintaining
and strengthening the bonds between all medical ser-
vices of member states, promoting medico-military
scientific activities, and developing and participating in
humanitarian operations.
Because of its unbiased membership policy, ICMM is
the only military organization with a formal in-force
memorandum of agreement with WHO. Through direct
engagements or indirect facilitation and empowerment
with ICMM, opportunities are being explored to work
with foreign militaries, to further facilitate IHR (2005)
compliance, and to facilitate force health protection and
global public health in concert with WHO. Joint initia-
tives include co-sponsoring a forum titled “Emerging
Table 4 Top 10 specific localized accomplishments, 2009
1. Of three influenza reference strains provided to WHO (A/California/7/2009, A/California/4/2009 and A/Texas/5/2009) by NHRC and USAFSAM, the
A/California/7/2009 was selected as the seed strain.
2. Two biosafety-level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories were commissioned in 2009 at NHRC in San Diego, Calif., and AFRIMS in Bangkok, Thailand; and two
BSL-2 laboratories were commissioned, one at the University of Buea, Cameroon, and one on the campus of the Cameroonian Army installation in
Yaoundé, Cameroon, under supervision of the Global Viral Forecasting Initiative.
3. NAMRU-3 partners reported the first definitive evidence of human cutaneous leishmaniasis from Leishmania major infections in Ghana.
4. AFRIMS published the first report of clinically significant Plasmodium falciparum malaria resistance to the potent artemisinin antimalarial drug class,
spurring WHO, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and host national malaria control officials to institute aggressive measures to contain and eliminate
artemisinin-resistant malaria in Southeast Asia.
5. The first documented cases of Venezuelan equine encephalitis, brucellosis, dengue and Q fever in Ecuador were reported by NMRCD-Lima, and
the first laboratory-confirmed cases of leptospirosis in the border areas of Thailand and Myanmar were reported by AFRIMS.
6. AFRIMS provided timely outbreak response services to the Nepali National Public Health laboratory, ultimately characterizing (by pulse-field gel
electrophoresis) nearly 6,000 cases of multidrug-resistant typhoid fever originating from a single point source, and uniformly quinolone-resistant.
7. NAMRU-3 worked closely with WHO to conduct novel A/H1N1 laboratory diagnostic training for 73 participants representing 32 different countries
in a strategic and timely two-week period in May 2009.
8. NEPMU-2, NAMRU-3, and AFHSC collaboratively supported CENTCOM efforts in establishing in-theatre novel A/H1N1 testing and isolation of
servicemembers deployed or deploying to sites around the world.
9. The WRAIR/USAMRU-K Malaria Diagnostics and Control Center of Excellence, established in 2003, having trained more than 600 malaria
microscopists, established new malaria diagnostics training capabilities in Nigeria and Tanzania, leading to a visit by the president of Tanzania to
WRAIR to establish new collaborations between the U.S. Army and Tanzania.
10. NMRCD, as part of its expansive febrile-disease surveillance network in the Amazon basin, published the first comprehensive study of the
etiologies of undifferentiated febrile illness in Ecuador, documenting the first laboratory-confirmed cases of Venezualan equine encephalitis,
brucellosis, dengue and Q fever in Ecuador.
WHO: World Health Organization; NHRC: Naval Health Research Center; USAFSAM: U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine; AFRIMS: Armed Forces Research
Institute of Medical Sciences; NAMRU-3: Naval Medical Research Unit Number 3; NMRCD: Naval Medical Research Center Detachment; NEPMU-2: Navy
Environmental Preventive Medical Unit Number 2; AFHSC: Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center; CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command; WRAIR: Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research; USAMRU-K: U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Kenya.
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tional Health Regulations (2005)” in September 2010 in
St. Petersburg, Russia, and movement toward develop-
ment of a military public health network to coordinate
and provide access to training, resources, and expertise
in public health practice and epidemiologic techniques
for member state use.
Conclusions
U.S. DoD has a long and impressive history of infectious
disease research and product development. The GEIS
program was developed at a time of need by DoD-spon-
sored U.S. and overseas research laboratories. The wis-
dom of establishing improved global DoD EID
surveillance capabilities is reinforced by numerous con-
tributions to global outbreaks, most recently the 2009
H1N1 pandemic. The greatly increased interest by other
DoD organizations and the U.S. government as a whole
also reinforces this wisdom.
For optimal preparedness, surveillance is an ongoing
process, not one that is implemented only in times of
public health emergency. Sustaining these programs also
avoids negative perceptions by foreign governments of
U.S. involvement only with the “surveillance priority
du jour.” The right mix of empowering surveillance
activities with capacity building is important to mitigate
perceptions of taking but not giving. With the frame-
work of current U.S. government guidelines, such as the
National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats and
IHR (2005), the world is closer than ever to truly work-
ing together on surveillance and control of infectious
diseases without consideration of borders.
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